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Abstract: Learning from incidents (LFI) is a useful approach when examining past events and de-
veloping measures to prevent ensuing recurrence. Although the reporting of incidents in the aircraft 
maintenance and continuing airworthiness domain is well appointed, it is often unclear how the 
maximum effect of safety data can be efficaciously applied in support of LFI in the area. From semi-
structured interviews, with thirty-four participants, the gathered data were thematically analyzed 
with the support of NVivo software. This study establishes a relationship between an incident in its 
lifecycle and the learning process. The main aim of this work is to elucidate factors that enable LFI. 
The analysis of the data revealed, for example, the benefits of a just culture and the use of formal 
continuation training programs in this respect. Moreover, it identified limitations inherent in cur-
rent processes such as poor event causation and poorly designed learning syllabi. Additionally, as-
pects such as a lack of regulatory requirements for competence in the areas of learning for managers 
and accountable persons currently exist. This thematic analysis could be used in support of organi-
zations examining their own processes for learning from incidents. Additionally, it can support the 
development of terms of reference for a continuing airworthiness regulatory working group to ex-
amine, strengthen and better apply LFI in the aviation industry. 
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1. Introduction 
If it were possible for all organizations to learn effective lessons from the past, the 
effects of future unwelcome events might be limited [1]. Aviation safety depends to a large 
extent on the efficacious efforts of all involved in the system [2]. Research has acknowl-
edged the importance of event information when it comes to learning and preventing re-
currence [3]. Thankfully, major events such as accidents are becoming less frequent and 
generate less points for learning [4]. In contrast, there are numerous incidents with less 
severe consequences and if appropriately considered, these could offer an earlier insight 
into the circumstances that enable unwelcome events. Predefined and relevant infor-
mation harvested from incident reporting systems is a major element of learning and pre-
serving acceptable levels of safety. Hobbs and Williamson [5] highlight the importance of 
aircraft maintenance staff being aware of the cumulative effect of “seemingly insignifi-
cant” incidents as this amplifies the need to be proactive when it comes to learning from 
incidents. This research undertook a qualitative examination of staff involved in aircraft 
maintenance and continuing airworthiness operations in order to identify factors that 
could augment learning from incidents within this industry sector. 
In the areas of continuing airworthiness and aircraft maintenance, safety manage-
ment systems include incident and occurrence reporting [6] as an obligation. It is common 
for incidents to be discovered within organizations and reported with the assistance of 
such “systems of systems” [7]. On an operational level, initial training on human factors 
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and company procedures is intended to specify and re-affirm the category and type of 
occurrence and incident that should be reported. Recent developments in European Un-
ion (EU) regulations [8] empower voluntary and confidential reporting and are independ-
ent of all other individual obligations. Detecting and identifying hazards highlighted 
through incident reporting systems is also recommended by the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization (ICAO) standards and recommended practices as an effective means of 
augmenting levels of safety. However, Gerede [9] strongly suggests that a failure to foster 
a just culture is considered to have a negative impact upon effective data collection (re-
porting), organizational learning and the subsequent ability to learn from incidents. 
Drupsteen and Wybo [10] reaffirm organizations use experience gained from past 
events in order to improve safety. Effective learning can be considered as a successful 
translation of safety information into knowledge. Utilizing information from events with 
learning potential can actively improve the operating environment and help prevent re-
currence. Learning in this context can often be experienced as modifying or implementing 
new knowledge where cultural, technical or procedural elements are integrated. There-
fore, when learning is transformed into measures to prevent re-occurrence, an organiza-
tion often has a reasonable means of mitigating future similar events. Argyris and Schön 
[11] highlight the importance of learning to detect and address effective responses to er-
rors. Their “theory in action” concept is the focal point for this determination. The first of 
its two components, “theory in use” is one that guides a person’s behavior. It is often 
“tacit” and is how people behave routinely. Very often these observed “habits” are un-
known to the specimen. The second element is known as “espoused theory”, namely what 
people say or think they do. Drupsteen and Guldenmund [12] mention that espoused the-
ory comprises of “the words we use to convey what we do, or what we like others to think 
we do”. 
However, it is important to re-affirm the linkages that exist between individuals and 
organizational learning. The introduction of safety management systems (SMS) has initi-
ated a shift in how organizational errors are viewed. Firstly, equipment has become in-
creasingly more reliable, but the human form has not displayed the same response. In the 
second instance, the impact of complexities associated with an increasing cognitive load 
for staff is just beginning to be realized. The existence of a potential for blaming an indi-
vidual is now being aligned with organizational responsibilities. Prior to this, event cau-
sation was often misrepresented or even over quantified the human input as organiza-
tional factors were not always considered. They offer an insight into the connection be-
tween individual actions and organizational initiatives designed to secure the best safety 
outcomes. Fogarty et al. [13] also recognize the role that both individual factors have on 
human error and the inputs both can have on preventing recurrence. 
ICAO Doc 9859 ICAO [14] defines a template for aviation operators and regulators 
to support the application of a variety of proactive, predictive and reactive oversight 
methodologies. In addition to routine monitoring schemes, voluntary and mandatory re-
porting, post incident follow-up, there are also regular safety oversight audits. These au-
dits and inspections often set out to establish if there is a difference between espoused 
theory and the theory in use (e.g., is the task being correctly performed in accordance with 
the documented procedure/work instruction or is there a deviation from approved data 
and practice?). However, Drupsteen and Guldenmund [12] caution auditors not to “focus 
too much on the documentation of procedures” alone. In such cases, the oversight audit 
may be ineffective because of its sole focus on espoused theories of the organization only 
and not the theory-in-use. These authors translate this idea of poor focus on theory in 
action, into a valid learning component arising from incidents. They also highlight the 
“espoused” aspect where those attempting to learn from incidents often fail to experience 
the desired learning because outcomes are not fully aligned with the practical objectives 
of a learning from incidents (LFI) initiative. For learning to be most effective, espoused 
theory and theory in use should be reasonably well aligned. Ward et al. [15] propose it is 
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necessary to further develop an operational model that can account for “what is meant to 
happen and what actually happens”. 
Continuing airworthiness and aircraft maintenance and activities performed in EU 
member states are subjected to rules that mandate reporting of defined issues. Reposito-
ries of reported data tend to be populated by sources that are predominantly the subject 
of mandatory reporting requirements. Conventional safety oversight models also only 
verify the presence of reporting media and repositories in this segment of the industry. 
Jacobsson et al. [16] avow the degree of interest invested in learning from incidents but 
question its efficiency in some organizations. Although unwelcome events are less preva-
lent, less severe events still provide learning opportunities. There is often only a primary 
focus for organizations upon reporting in line with each state’s own reporting obligations. 
Unfortunately, a narrow focus on this single element of an incident in its lifecycle can 
negate the potential benefits of learning from incidents at an organizational level. The ab-
sence of clearly defined competency requirements [6] that support a pedagogy for learn-
ing from incidents for continuing airworthiness staff could also be considered an imped-
iment to effective learning in the domain. 
The featured industry sector is regulated by the application and upkeep of numerous 
requirements in the jurisdictions of operation. In general, a costly regulatory overhead 
tends to be carried by regulating states and operators to support safe and viable activity. 
However, a growing tendency to increase regulatory requirements in pursuance of safer 
activity across the segments may not always offer the same returns as previously realized 
by states. Brunel [17] (p.45) suggests, “…it is impossible to make men perfect: the men will 
always remain the same as they are now and no legislation will make him have more 
presence of mind…”. Furniss et al. [18] reviewed the Hollnagel [19] Functional Resonance 
Analysis Method (FRAM) which explores how functional variability resonates within sys-
tems, i.e., how well comprising elements function in a system. They also consider how 
FRAM can be modified to support complex socio technical system improvements. Per-
haps as the paradigm supporting the linearity of regulatory oversight shifts, proactive 
regulatory inputs will also influence more effective safety outputs as intricacy increases. 
1.1. Systematic Literature Review 
The primary reason for conducting a systematic review was to examine how learning 
from incidents occurs in aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness management. 
Other sectors and the issues impacting learning in these areas were also considered. The 
literature review sets out to establish factors that contribute to or potentially constrain 
learning from incidents in the subject domain. Applying a qualitative research approach 
is advantageous as it can provide a deeper contextual understanding of the literature and 
can assist with better research integration. The application of rigor and comprehensive-
ness can assist with advancing knowledge and identifying research gaps and aspects for 
further research in this area. Okoli and Schabram [20] suggest “a dedicated methodologi-
cal approach is necessary in any kind of literature review”. A preliminary search of liter-
ature highlighted a scarcity of best-practice guidelines for conducting systematic literature 
reviews in this area. 
Qualitative research involves handling considerable volumes of data and a degree of 
discipline is required so that search results, decisions regarding subject inclusions and 
exclusions are recorded and references are well managed. Endnote was used in support 
of the literature review during this research. An electronic database is useful for support-
ing a search strategy, arranging publications and storing references [21]. The qualitative 
data analysis software NVivo (NVivo 12, QSR International, Melbourne, Australia) was 
used to augment the data management, storage and analysis associated with the literature 
review. NVivo possesses many functions, such as facilitating the synthesis of a review 
[22]. A systematic search of in excess of 1000 publications was performed in the following 
databases: Web of Science, Scopus, IEEE Xplore, ProQuest and EBSCO. The following pre-
defined search terms were applied: “learning from incidents”, “learning from 
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experience”, “aircraft maintenance”, “aircraft management” and “safety management 
systems”. A practical screening of title and abstract was applied to each manuscript using 
predefined terms (e.g., subject, setting, publication, year). This part of the process had to 
be broad enough to create a sufficient number of applicable publications but also had to 
be practically manageable. The following criteria were implemented for the practical 
screening of the source bibliographic details, title and abstract: 
 Subject—Related to learning from incidents and past experiences. 
 Setting—Any high reliability industry or sector where learning from incidents is crit-
ical. 
 Publication—Journal or peer-reviewed conference proceedings. 
 Date range—published post 1992. The year 1992 was the starting point for the screen-
ing process, since at the time of planning the research project, 25 years was consid-
ered to be a reasonable timespan to include material pertaining to learning from in-
cidents. 
The output of the practical screen step produced a list of publications denoted as the 
screened set of publications. An Endnote library was then created to store and manage 
the full text of the retrieved publications. The next step involved filtering the publications 
into primary and secondary publication subsets using only primary research manuscripts 
in the next phase. Applying a set of criteria helps to reduce any researcher bias in the 
screening system. A set of inclusion and exclusion criteria [23] was developed in accord-
ance with the guidelines included in [24] and [25], listed in Table 1. Two researchers were 
involved in the screening process. 
Table 1. Inclusion and exclusion criteria used for the filtering of the subset of primary publications. 
Included Excluded 
Research studies Literature reviews 
Qualitative and mixed methods Quantitative methods 
Perceptions and experiences Focused on decision-making and legislative requirements 
Reference to just culture Not about “no blame” or a punitive approach  
High reliability settings Non high reliability settings 
Published post 1992  
Peer-reviewed publications  
Industry based settings  
Original studies  
The final set of 18 papers was imported into NVivo and the following analysis ap-
proach, as defined by Bandara et al. [22], was used for the selection of the codification 
themes: 
 Deductive—themes reported on are predetermined to some extent. In this case, these 
predetermined themes were the output of a focus group process. 
 Inductive—themes reported are derived from analysis of the literature. 
NVivo is limited in terms of providing thematic classifications based on the occur-
rence of key words but can assist with identifying relationships between words and 
phrases amongst publications. It also provided thematic classifications of data based on 
the occurrence of key words and phrases. The coding process consisted of selecting rele-
vant passages of text that were captured in one or several of the framework nodes. Maykut 
and Morehouse [26] defines a propositional statement as “a statement of fact the re-
searcher tentatively proposes, based on the data”. Memos were used to draft these sum-
mary statements which formed part of the literature review. Central to the idea of learning 
is how an incident is generally moderated during its useful existence. Section 1.2 docu-
ments this approach. 
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1.2. The Notion of a Generic Incident Lifecycle 
Figure 1 illustrates how an incident tends to be managed through its quiddity. This 
view is one possible way of representing the elements comprising a lifecycle view. Cooke 
and Rohleder [27] suggest it should also be evident that an incident system will operate 
most effectively when a safety management system has already been put in place and 
avoidable risks are addressed. They propose an effective system that addresses: identifi-
cation and response, reporting, investigation, identifying causal structure, making recom-
mendations, communicating and recalling incident learning, and implementing corrective 
actions. Drupsteen et al. [28] also consider an incident from a learning perspective in its 
cycle. Their main constituents are investigating and analyzing incidents, planning inter-
ventions, intervening and evaluating (each of these four stages are further sub-divided 
into eleven sub-components). Continuing airworthiness-related incidents are notified by 
way of a formal mechanism of reporting. During the data gathering phase of this research, 
the steps outlined in Figure 1 were found to be dictated by regulatory requirements [6,8]. 
Once the incident enters its lifecycle, it ideally transverses a process that transforms the 
information gathered into knowledge. Figure 1 and the contiguous paragraph offer an 
overview of how the capture and processing of the incident information occurs in practice. 
 
Figure 1. An example of an aviation incident lifecycle within the continuing airworthiness and 
aircraft maintenance sector. 
Continuing airworthiness-related serious incidents are rare but often due to environ-
mental, cognitive and mechanical demands, reportable and unreportable events do occur. 
All organizations in the industry segment subscribe to a reporting system and reports can 
be made electronically or in paper form in smaller organizations. The main underpinning 
regulation in Europe, EU regulation 2018/1139 [29], refers to a management system and 
mandates an organization to implement and maintain such a system to ensure compliance 
with these essential requirements. In practice, although a reporter can report events di-
rectly to an aviation authority, all organizations are required to have an internal reporting 
system also. A focal point/gate keeper will process these reports either internally and/or 
inform third party stakeholders such as aviation authority or aircraft manufacturer as re-
quired by procedure. Depending on the event, technical management may determine 
there are immediate actions required to recover a situation or restore serviceability. While 
a small number of scenarios will require an event to be investigated fully before an aircraft 
returns to service, many incidents are investigated post event. As soon as causation is 
established, if accepted by the relevant technical function, the report is closed. This man-
agement system is strongly influenced by regulatory requirements and procedural form 
and is a pre-eminent influence on how an incident and its actors behave from the time a 
report is made to the time its impact has been terminated. One of the limitations inherent 
in this cycle is that lessons tend to be delivered at a later point in time mostly through the 
medium of recurrent training programs such as continuation and human factors training. 
Therefore, there is often a hiatus in the feedback cycle. However, the effectiveness of the 
process and the perceived contribution to learning are not fully reflected in this view. 
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1.3. A Potential Learning Cycle Emerges 
According to Lindberg et al. [30], in order to prevent accidents, it is essential to learn 
from previous accidents and incidents. Lukic et al. [31] suggest that in order to increase 
the effectiveness of learning from incidents, it is necessary to understand who should be 
included in the learning process. In Figure 2, the incident lifecycle is aligned with the 
learning process in order to highlight where potential improvements might be made. As 
the incident is managed and causation is established, there are potential avenues open for 
learning. The ultimate desired outcome is that adequate measures are put in place to pre-
vent a recurrence of the event. However, the lessons available in a potential learning prod-
uct are not always used to best effect when considering the Figure 1 process. Drupsteen 
et al. [28] state that “many incidents occur because organizations fail to learn from past 
lessons”, because the traditional approach often stops short of preventing future incidents. 
Their research examines: investigating and analyzing incidents, planning and prevention, 
intervening and evaluating steps in a learning process. Ward et al. [15] found that the 
resulting relationship between the individuals and the systems have a direct impact upon 
the system and prevailing environment. Silva et al. [3] examined how organizations use 
accident information to reduce the occurrence of unwelcome events. Drupsteen and Wybo 
[10] found that hindsight can determine if an organization did learn from an event but 
there are no models to assist with gauging the “propensity” of an organization to learn. 
Drupsteen and Hasle [1] suggest that learning can be improved if limiting factors are ad-
dressed. 
The proposed enhancement (shown in Figure 2) to the generic lifecycle in the “tradi-
tional” approach represents a novel view and brings the learning product into focus. This 
figure highlights the benefits of ensuring the feedback loop of an incident is centered on 
the learning product. Treating its development as an iterative process ensures all steps in 
the cycle are included and where deficiencies are noted, they can be identified and com-
municated during the iterations. This can assist with delivery of timely and sustainable 
learning and help prevent an inability to think, talk and see what actions are proper in 
specific situations [32]. According to Drupsteen et al. [28], it is necessary to gain an insight 
into the steps of the process to identify factors that hinder learning in order to make im-
provements. The research suggests an emphasis on accessible, timely and appropriate 
learning content could provide all stakeholders in the process with better value for their 
efforts. Perhaps one reason that the customary incident lifecycle and its limitations prevail 
is related to management theory. While innovators like Taylor [33] are responsible for 
advances in management, such theories have not always fully considered safety and 
learning. The early 1900s witnessed a time when it was necessary to inaugurate efficien-
cies in production by initially decomposing tasks in order to introduce liner efficiencies. 
The limitations experienced in incident learning processes today may relate to this cir-
cumscribed tradition. 
 
Figure 2. Incident learning product and process (broken line denotes iterative learning feedback). 
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2. Materials and Methods 
2.1. Philosophical Underpinnings 
The fields of science and philosophy consider ontology and epistemology in terms of 
What is the nature of reality? and How is human knowledge constructed? The ascendant 
ideologies of positivism and interpretivism can be applied in support of these philosoph-
ical differences [34–37]. Hirschheim [38] puts forward the aim of positivism to, “seek to 
explain and predict what happens in the social world by searching for irregularities and 
causal relationships between its constituent elements”. In contrast to this stance, 
Schwandt [39] suggests the aim of interpretivism is to gain understanding. Interpretive 
research seeks to develop a richer understanding of the complex world of lived experience 
from the point of view of those who live in it. “This goal is variously spoken of as an abiding 
concern for the life world, for the emic point of view, for understanding meaning, for grasping the 
actor’s definition of a situation, for verstehen” [39] (p.118). 
The intent of this qualitative study was to understand how various situations impact 
on learning from incidents in the aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness man-
agement domain by interacting with the participants on a social plane. Thus, in order to 
gain an empathetic understanding of the participants and their actions, the pursuit of 
“verstehen” considers adopting an interpretive paragon as an approach. This approach is 
not initiated with the aid of a hypothesis intended for testing but rather using a lodestar 
that guides the researcher to a point of discovery supported with an inductive modus 
operandi. The study is unwavering in its support for the view that (individual and com-
bined) qualitative and quantitative approaches possess equal value in terms of their in-
vestigative potential in this area of focus. In summary, the project employs a qualitative 
research methodology in an effort to generate “rich” findings in support of gaining a good 
understanding of the learning environment in the featured domain. According to Maykut 
and Morehouse [26], the purpose of qualitative research is to discover the inner world of 
perceptions and meaning-making in order to gain an understanding to describe and ex-
plain certain social phenomenon from participants’ perspectives. In order to accomplish 
this, focus group activity was managed concurrently with the literature review. These ac-
tivities cumulatively generated five themes which were used as the basis for a semi-struc-
tured interview template. The project employed a qualitative research methodology in an 
effort to generate “rich” findings in support of gaining a good understanding of the learn-
ing environment in the featured domain. The outcome of a qualitative research initiative 
was contextual findings as opposed to broad generalizations. 
2.2. Focus Group 
According to Kitzinger [40], “focus groups are group discussions organized to ex-
plore a specific set of issues such as people’s views and experiences…”. The idea of con-
ducting group interviews is not a new one. Bogardus [41] is an early example of a refer-
ence to utilizing the group interview. Frey and Fontana [42] suggest that group interviews 
can be formally structured for a specific purpose or can be performed in a more informal 
setting where a researcher can “stimulate a group discussion”. Specific examples in the 
literature of focus groups being developed systematically within the area of aircraft 
maintenance and management are scarce. Frey and Fontana [42] state that although group 
interviews have implicitly informed research, often they are not formally acknowledged 
as part of the process. Powell and Single [43] remind us that when recruiting focus group 
participants, one must be mindful of systemic biases. Averting this was ensured by being 
careful to enlist the participants from different organizations and different positions of 
responsibility. Three sessions comprising of three industry professionals within each 
group were successfully moderated by the researcher. During the three phases of working 
with the focus group, statements and terms were recorded as dialogue amongst the mem-
bers and observed. The second meeting of the focus group developed four codes (safety, 
regulatory compliance, root cause, reporting) that had emerged from the group’s earlier 
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outputs. These four codes were further distilled during the focus group activity and were 
consolidated into two themes (reporting, root cause) that were to eventually form part of 
the piloted semi-structured interview instrument. 
Reporting and root-cause themes were the result of the draft consolidation of the 
comments and emerging codes. In concert with the focus group activities, a literature re-
view was performed by the researchers and this generated three further themes as re-
flected in Table 2. 
Table 2. Codification themes used in the NVivo analysis of the final set of publications. 
Codification Theme Description Origin 
Root Cause Reason to establish causation  Focus Group 
Reporting Value of reporting to learning from incidents Focus Group 
Learning from Incidents Outcomes of learning from incidents Literature Analysis 
Just culture Impact of just culture on learning from incidents Literature Analysis 
Precursors Contribution of precursors to learning from incidents Literature Analysis 
 
The resulting draft semi-structured template (provided in Appendix A) containing 
the five themes was scrutinized by the focus group. The constituent questions relating to 
each theme and the running order of the document was subject to many minor changes 
during the individual piloting of the instrument with the three group members. 
2.3. Data Collection 
Data were gathered from seven organizations using a semi-structured interview tem-
plate. The participating organizations were involved in aircraft maintenance and contin-
uing airworthiness activities. Building trust and commitment, as proffered by Chatzi [44] 
and Chatz et al., [45] was deemed to be a necessary tenet of a successful data collection 
exercise. Managing the interview process with the support of senior staff complimented 
visible top-down support for the research and ensured there would be no confusion re-
garding access to what some organizations often classify as sensitive commercial data. 
The aim was to explore how learning from incidents occurs and what can constrain learn-
ing in the area of focus. The pilot phase ensured the desired outcome of the main data 
collection phase would be congruent with the aims of the study. The interviews were rec-
orded, transcribed and participants could not be identified from the recordings or tran-
scripts. Full ethical approval for the data gathering was granted by the University. 
2.3.1. Instrument 
Data were collected using semi-structured interviews, lasting on average sixty 
minutes. The “aide memoir” was arranged so that participants could offer a flexible re-
sponse and any emerging themes could be identified. The semi-structured approach fa-
cilitated emphasis being placed upon any points that warranted further focus or exami-
nation by the researchers. An example of the interview template is included in Appendix 
A. Interviewees were asked to give an example of a recent incident they were familiar 
with. The structure of the template, (a) probed process around reporting and (b) elicited 
the participants perception of learning from incidents within their organizations. Follow-
ing on from the initial contact on reporting, the participants discussed just culture, learn-
ing, root-cause and incident precursors during their individual engagements with the re-
searchers. 
2.3.2. Participants 
The “key issue in selecting and making decisions about the appropriate unit of anal-
ysis is to decide what it is you want to be able to say something about at the end of the 
study” [46] (p.168). The objective of this study was to investigate individuals’ perceptions 
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of how learning from incidents takes place and the obstacles present in the maintenance 
and continuing airworthiness management domain of the aviation industry segment. 
There were thirty-four (34) participants in total, as presented in Table 3. 
Table 3. Participants in the study (n = 34). 
Participant Roles Number 
Category B1 Engineer 4 
Supervisor 3 
Category A Mechanic 3 
Quality Assurance Engineer 3 
Category B2 Engineer 2 
Shift Controller 2 
Contract Composite Inspector 1 
Inspector  1 
Aeronautical Engineer 1 
Category B1/B2 Engineer 1 
Maintenance Manager 1 
Technical Safety Manager 1 
Technical Services Manager 1 
Line Maintenance Manager 1 
Deputy Quality Manager 1 
Maintenance Control Manager 1 
Maintenance Planner 1 
Maintenance Safety Officer 1 
Apprentice Technician 1 
Each of the organizations maintained between 6 and 300 aircraft at the time of the 
study. While traditional reporting and learning themes were evident outputs from the 
focus group meetings, it was decided that the data would be collected through one-to-one 
semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews permitted the researchers to get a 
deeper understanding of complex organizational and social interactions and at the same 
time follow a construct. The participating organizations were selected based upon them 
being accredited to perform aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness activities 
since the inception of EU regulation 1321/2014 [6]. Within this domain, there are categories 
of staff that are required to be aware of incident reporting and make a report as necessary 
(e.g., technical managers, certifying staff, quality assurance staff, stores personnel, tech-
nical services). Each organization is required under legislation to employ a satisfactory 
level of staff regardless of their aviation activities. As a minimum, at least one of each of 
these roles was represented in the study. It was ensured that at least one staff member 
from each discipline was included in the study and had made a report in the previous 
twelve months. As certifying staff, technical managers and quality assurance staff are by 
virtue of their position active reporters (due to their exposure to active operations), staff 
in these disciplines were well represented in the study’s cohort. Participation in the study 
was on a voluntary basis and all who participated were acquainted with the project prior 
to performing the interviews. All participants signed consent forms. 
2.4. Data Analysis 
Thematic analysis was the method chosen to support the analysis of the study’s data. 
The Braun and Clarke [47] six-step proposition, which consists of eight discreet cycles, in 
conjunction with the QDA Training [48] material, formed the basis of the analysis tech-
nique. A practical iterative approach was adopted throughout the analysis where the data 
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were formally arranged into discrete phases. The eight individual stages of analysis dis-
tributed over the six phases were designed to support a robust and rigorous analysis of 
the data. Table 4 below illustrates the stages and processes outlined and performed in 
NVivo and links this to the practical guidelines set out in Braun and Clarke [47]. Their six-
step approach that supports the application of thematic analysis is shown in column one 
and the corresponding application in NVivo is shown in column two. The third column 
features the strategic elements of coding as the researcher moved from the initial partici-
pant-led descriptive coding, to the secondary coding which was more interpretative in 
nature indicating this phase of coding was both researcher- and participant-led. The final 
abstraction to themes was researcher informed only. This phase was designed to allow the 
researchers to engage the participant in direct dialogue with a wider arena such as litera-
ture and policy or strategy for example. The fourth and final column illustrates the more 
iterative nature of the coding, analysis and reporting of proceedings that terminate in a 
conclusion. 
Phase 1 activity involves familiarizing oneself with the transcribed data. In this first 
phase, the data were loaded into NVivo. It was checked and re-read several times to en-
sure accuracy of the uploaded transcripts. At the end of the phase activity, initial codes 
were noted down and retained. 
Generating initial codes (open coding: phase 2)—According to Lincoln and Guba [49] 
(p.345), a data unit can be defined as the “smallest piece of information about something 
that can stand by itself, that is, it must be interpretable in the absence of any additional 
information other than a broad understanding of the context in which the inquiry is car-
ried out”. The open coding is intended to systemically organize the data and uncover the 
essential ideas found in the data [50]. Each discrete unit of data is labelled in line with the 
phenomenon it represents. The second phase required broad participant-driven open cod-
ing of the interview transcripts recorded during the data gathering step of the research 
study. Features of interest were coded in a systematic way across the complete dataset 
where data relevant to each code were collected. Clear labels were allocated to these codes 
and definitions to serve as rules for inclusion [26]. 
A set of provisional categories was generated for the segmented data to be coded to. 
These categories were descriptions of concepts and themes in broad terms. They took two 
forms: researcher-driven and participant-driven. The former was derived from a theoret-
ical framework underpinning the study and the latter from the knowledge gained of the 
participants’ language and customs. Hammersley and Atkinson [51] (p.153) consider the 
importance of participant-driven categories: “the actual words people use can be of con-
siderable analytic importance as the ‘situated vocabularies’ employed provide valuable 
information about the way in which members of a particular culture organize their per-
ceptions of the world, and so engage in the social construction of reality”. 
Searching for themes—In phase 3, codes from phase 2 were collated into categories 
of codes by structuring all the data relevant to each potential category into a framework 
that could be used in support of further analysis. This phase also included distilling, re-
labelling and merging common codes that were generated in phase 3 to ensure the labels 
and definitions for inclusion were an accurate reflection of the coded content. These first-
round categories are best described as broad descriptions of concepts and themes. During 
the analytical process they underwent content and definition change and the existence of 
the two forms of category provides an important means of traversing between “natural” 
and “theoretical” discourses. Araujo [52] (p.68) suggests that “codes should be viewed in two 
ways: as part of the analyst’s wider theoretical framework and as grounded in the data.; the 
process of coding data should be regarded as an important intermediary step in translating 
social actors’ frames of meaning into the frame of theoretical discourse; coding frames there-
fore, mediate between the ‘natural’ everyday discourse and the theoretical discourses in social 
science”. 
Reviewing themes (coding on) in phase 4 required further decomposition of the study 
units of data identified in phase 1. This activity was intended to support a greater 
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understanding of the highly qualitative elements and gain a deeper appreciation of the mean-
ings contained within. It should be noted that not every task could be further broken down 
and this meant that the activity was performed only as required. Restructured codes were 
broken down into further sub-codes in order to augment a greater understanding of the mean-
ings embedded within them. These distinctive aspects included communication with man-
agement, discovering latent issues, just culture, learning lessons, reporting, root causes and 
story of an incident. 
Defining and naming themes in phase 5 of the data analysis was concerned with analyz-
ing the tentative categories identified in phase 2 for their properties and characteristics. This is 
a pre-cursor to drafting a propositional statement for each category. Developing analytical 
memos moves the process beyond identification and description of broad categories to a po-
sition of analyzing and fusing meanings in the data under each category. This progressed to 
drafting a statement that aspires to illustrate the concerted meaning of the segments of data 
coded to each category. Maykut and Morehouse [26] (p.140) defines a propositional statement 
as, “a statement of fact the researcher tentatively proposes, based on data”. This phase in addition to 
further data analysis to refine the specifics for each theme, generated clear definitions and a 
name for each theme. It also involved data reduction by consolidating categories from all three 
cycles into a more abstract, philosophical and literature-based thematic framework and con-
ceptually mapping and exploring their relationships with one another for reporting purposes. 
Producing the report in phase 6 required analytical memos to be written against the 
higher-level themes to present an accurate summary of the content of each category and its 
codes and to also propose findings. The tasks associated with phase 6 included (i) generating 
analytical memos, (ii) testing and validating and (iii) synthesizing the memos coherently and 
cohesively, and were performed simultaneously. Writing the analytical memos against the 
higher-level codes (i.e., learning from incidents, learning process and learning product) re-
quired an accurate summary of each category and its codes and findings against categories. 
These memos considered a few key areas: 
1. The content of the cluster of codes which were being reported on. 
2. Patterns where relevant. 
3. Considering background information noted against participants and examining any pat-
terns relating to participants’ profiles. 
4. Considering any relationship between codes and their importance in relation to the re-
search questions. 
5. Noting any primary sources relating to the context of the relationship with the literature 
in addition to highlighting any gaps in the literature. 
Testing, validating and revising analytical memos was performed in phase 7. The pur-
pose of this was to provide a self-audit of the proposed findings by soliciting evidence in the 
data beyond just textual quotes in support of the recorded findings and to also expand on 
deeper meanings within the data. This required the data to be interrogated, not only relying 
on relationships across and between categories, but also a degree of cross tabulation with de-
mographics, observations and the literature. The outcome of this phase was evidence-based 
findings as each proposed finding was validated by being rooted in the data themselves and 
was reliant on the creation of reports in support of substantiated findings. 
The discipline of writing analytical memos was used during the data analysis process. 
Birks et al. [53] believe “memoing serves to assist the researcher in making conceptual leaps 
from raw data to those abstractions that explain research phenomena in the context of which 
it is examined”. In general, memos were employed at the “ideation” stage when the researcher 
was developing thought processes and early in the data capture phase. As decisions were 
made, the early processes and rationale for final analysis iterations were recorded using this 
medium. Memos were further employed to preserve an objective closeness to the harvested 
data and to maintain the context of each semi-structured interview at the participating indi-
viduals’ level. Developing ideas, reasons for considering possible category relationships and 
connections was also possible through the application of the analytical memo process. The 
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rigorous support memoing offered served to guide the analysis of the data through different 
levels of abstraction [54]. The rule of this activity served to ensure a high degree of continuity 
between the outputs of ideation and the evolving interpretation that were honed through the 
researchers’ articulation, exploration and their iterations of the data. Overall, this drew out the 
meanings in the data through the increased sensitivity the researchers were offered by apply-
ing the memoing process [53]. 
In phase 8, the analytical memos were synthesized into a coherent and cohesive report 
with the findings well supported. The final phase involved the assembly of the narrative with 
the data extracts while appreciating the product of this amalgam in the context of the related 
literature. The example features the finding, clear links to the interview data and literature and 
an explanatory narrative in the form of a memo. This finally resulted in the compilation of the 
report which contained the results and discussion elements of the body of work. 
Table 4. Stages and Process Involved in Qualitative Analysis. Adapted from Braun and Clarke [47] and QDATRAINING 
Training [48] material. 
Analytical Process 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006) 
[47] 
Practical application of Braun and 






with the data  
Transcribing data (if necessary), reading 
and re-reading the data, noting down 
initial ideas. Import data into the NVivo 
data management tool 
Data Management 
(Open and hierar-



















Assigning data to re-




Refining and distilling 
more abstract concepts 
 










2. Generating initial 
codes 
 
Phase 2.Open Coding:Coding interest-
ing features of the data in a systematic 
fashion across the entire data set, col-
lecting data relevant to each code 
3. Searching for themes 
Phase 3.Categorization of Codes:Collat-
ing codes into potential themes, gather-
ing all data relevant to each potential 
theme 
4. Reviewing themes 
Phase 4.Coding on:Checking if the 
themes work in relation to the coded ex-
tracts (level 1) and the entire data set 
(level 2), generating a thematic “map” of 
the analysis 
5. Defining and naming 
themes 
Phase 5.Data Reduction:On-going analy-
sis to refine the specifics of each theme, 
and the overall story (storylines) the 
analysis tells, generating clear defini-
tions and names for each theme 
6. Producing the report 
Phase 6.Generating Analytical Memos. 
Phase 7. —Testing and Validating.Phase 
8.Synthesizing Analytical Memos.  
The final opportunity for analysis. Selec-
tion of vivid, compelling extract exam-
ples, final analysis of selected extracts, 
relating back of the analysis to the re-
search question and literature, produc-
ing a scholarly report of the analysis 
[47,48] 
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In summary, this study adopted an interpretative approach pivoting on the fact that 
it was of an exploratory nature. The study performed thirty-four interviews in eight air-
craft maintenance and management organizations based in Ireland. An analysis of various 
potential research methods and means of data collection resulted in the following research 
design being implemented. A thematic analysis approach was employed as a research 
methodology: 
 Unit of analysis is an individual; 
 Semi-structured interview guide was constructed following a systematic analysis of 
literature and the use of a focus group; 
 Data were collected through qualitative interviews; 
 Thirty-four interviews were collected in locations endorsed by eight organizations; 
 Qualitative analysis based on the guidelines from Braun and Clarke [47] (thematic 
analysis) employing a six-phase approach was used in the study. 
3. Results and Discussion 
3.1. Framework 
Figure 3 presents a framework that offers an insight into how the present study ap-
plied the research inputs and produced the results. 
 
Figure 3. Research study framework. 
The top layer reflects the five themes that formed the basis for the data gathering 
template. These themes were developed through an iterative process of conducting focus 
group sessions with two themes emerging, i.e., root cause and reporting. Concurrently, a 
systematic literature review was performed using NVivo software to assist the researchers 
manage over 1000 screened publications. Following a thematic analysis of the data, three 
main themes (Appendix B) emerged from a final cache of 18 publications, i.e., learning 
from incidents, precursors and just culture. The five themes informed the structure of a 
data gathering instrument that supported 34 semi-structured interviews in the continuing 
airworthiness segment of the industry. Following transcription, the data were uploaded 
to NVivo where they were thematically analyzed using the Braun and Clarke [47] frame-
work. The outputs from the thematic analysis distilled the interview analysis into three 
main outputs, i.e., learning from incidents, learning process and learning product. The 
lower tier represents the elements the themes were comprised of and the findings are pre-
sented under these headings (Table 5). 
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Table 5. Summary of results. 1 Learning from incidents (LFI) is a safety management activity with a desired outcome of 
preventing unwelcome event recurrence.2 A learning process facilitates a change in knowledge and behavior intended to 
support LFI.3 Safety related information arising from the LFI process. 
Learning from incidents 1 Learning process 2 Learning product 3 
The decision to report an incident can be 
impacted by the perceived commercial 
pressure and the potential for embarrass-
ment associated with making a mistake, 
amongst front line maintenance staff.  
The release of a safe aviation product is 
the primary goal all operational mainte-
nance and management staff espouse to. 
In the organizations supporting the 
study, it was apparent that incidents are 
managed with the support of a consistent 
life-cycle methodology. 
Identifying and understanding organiza-
tional behavioral and human factors are 
important elements affecting decisions to 
report.  
Single-loop learning is a level of learning 
that can exist in a dynamic operational 
environment where a “find and fix” 
ethos exists. 
Learning products that arise from the 
managed lifecycle of an incident are in-
tended to impart sufficient learning to 
prevent recurrence or occurrence of same 
or similar events. 
Inadequately resourced investigation 
and follow up of incidents does not sup-
port the determination of accurate event 
causation and measures to prevent simi-
lar incidents reoccurring. 
The mandatory human factors continua-
tion training program is considered by 
study participants to be an effective ena-
bler of double-loop learning. 
While aircraft manufacturers generally 
provide feedback on notified incidents, 
component manufacturers provide less 
feedback with little or no feedback aris-
ing from aviation authorities on submit-
ted reports in the jurisdiction of the 
study. 
The recognition of the extended impact 
of under-reporting on “levels of learn-
ing” is not always a priority in some or-
ganizations. 
Evidence amongst study participants 
where a review of single and double-
loop learning within organizations was 
not available during the study. 
The cost of classroom delivered continu-
ation training is a primary consideration 
for most organizations. 
The absence of a potential learning prod-
uct that results from effective reporting is 
an impediment when attempting to 
gauge the effectiveness of learning. 
No formal requirement for competence 
in the areas of learning for managers and 
accountable persons exists in EU regula-
tion 1321/2014. 
Computer based training is an option 
that is under trial by some organizations 
but there are concerns amongst opera-
tional staff regarding its overall effective-
ness in its current form. 
Pressure to prematurely close incident 
reports does not promote thorough event 
causation and measures to prevent simi-
lar incidents reoccurring. 
No competence requirements for staff in-
volved in the development or delivery of 
formal human factors continuation train-
ing programs. 
Just culture has a positive impact on re-
porting rates. 
  
Feedback to staff on incident causation 
factors from an information and learning 
perspective is important. 
  
Poorly designed continuation training 
syllabi do not support effective learning. 
  
Timely follow up to incident reports sup-
ports more effective learning outputs 
from the reporting process. 
3.1.1. Learning form incidents—Acquiring, Processing and Storing data 
Incident reporting is accepted as a worthwhile activity amongst those participating 
in the study. This is based on the collective notion that the initiative raises awareness of 
incidents and potential hazards and can therefore help prevent event recurrence. The au-
thors recognize that awareness is an important component of learning from incidents. Sit-
uations do arise where due to lack of report data, it is questionable if all the necessary 
reports are being submitted as required. Amongst the constraints to making a report are 
perceived production pressures and the potential embarrassment that could arise from 
making a mistake and highlighting it [5]. There are just culture concerns amongst some 
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staff because they do not always know what the impact for them personally will be if they 
submit an incident report [44]. 
A dedicated focal point in organizations is essential for the systematic management 
of reported incidents. Where this discipline is applied, the process owner is responsible 
for highlighting reported issues and raising the necessary awareness amongst operational 
staff. Once an incident is acquired through the efforts of a reporting system, some form of 
processing and analysis is necessary. The availability of adequate resources for determin-
ing causation and implementing measures to prevent recurrence was identified as a pri-
mary point of concern. Perceived premature closure of reports was also highlighted 
amongst participants. There was a call for improved accountability and transparency on 
decisions relating to some closure actions. Respondents associate the practice of applying 
commercial key performance indicators to safety management as shallow efforts are 
sometimes made by organizations to expeditiously and prematurely close reports on oc-
casion. Incident reporting and safety management initiatives have been in existence for 
some time. Large repositories of associated safety data are stored in many organizations. 
Although entities are mandated to inform key stakeholders, there is a strong opinion 
amongst some participants that the data repositories could be aggregated and put to better 
use in support of learning amongst all operators. 
3.1.2. Learning Process—Single-loop, Double-loop and Deutero Learning 
The interview data confirms that safety is a primary underpinning value in the or-
ganizations that participated in the study. The release of a safe product, i.e., an aircraft or 
component, is a formative pursuit and measure of learning. In organizational environ-
ments where a “find and fix” ethos may prevail, single-loop learning [11] is evident in the 
examples presented. 
A desired outcome of double-loop learning [11] is often witnessed for example 
through the adjustment of environmental, behavioral and procedural norms. Instances of 
double-loop learning can be evident following unsuccessful attempts through single-loop 
learning where causation is then adequately understood and actioned. Continuation 
(mandatory in-service) training was considered by study participants as an effective 
mechanism that enables double-loop learning. During the study, it was apparent that sin-
gle and double learning loops are recognized amongst many participants as having dif-
fering capabilities in terms of delivering an effective learning product. However, there 
was no evidence of formal reviews of single and double-loop learning being performed 
within the participants’ organizations. Although deutero-learning [55] [11] may be con-
sidered as a natural extension of other levels of learning, the concept did not feature 
strongly amongst the participants. A review of the EU1321/2014 [6] implementing require-
ments confirms an absence of any mandatory requirement to review learning processes. 
3.1.3. Learning Product—Effectiveness and Types of Knowledge 
Continuation training is a mandated European requirement [6] for all aircraft mainte-
nance and continuing airworthiness management organizations. It is a product as well as a 
medium for imparting learning from incidents and safety related hazards. It was identified 
during the study that the learning product is shared amongst staff through three primary 
means of distribution: formally delivered continuation training, tool-box talks and safety brief-
ings and electronic, paper, notice board and “read and sign” safety publications. The study 
suggests a learning product can arise as a result of an output from an incident lifecycle. Feed-
back from submitted occurrences to stakeholders varies from very good to poor. Cost is seen 
as a major consideration in some of the participating organizations when planning continua-
tion training delivery. Although computer-based training is being considered in some compa-
nies as a viable option to class-room delivery, concerns are evident in respect of effectiveness 
of this medium in its current form. Bedwell and Salas [56] suggest computer-based training 
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(CBT) can be used as a methodology for providing, “systematic, structured learning; a useful tool 
when properly designed”. 
The perceived overburdening of operational staff with complex learning products and 
excessive cognitive loads was recorded as an impediment to learning during the study. Par-
ticipants suggested this can arise from poorly designed training syllabi delivered during peri-
ods of high operational activity. 
Four knowledge types were identified and relate to: conceptual, dispositional, proce-
dural and locative knowledge forms [57]. One of the key objectives of learning from incidents 
is to identify the type of knowledge needed to prevent an issue recurring. When a reportable 
issue, for example, is discovered, the submitted report will identify “what” happened. Subse-
quent follow up will set out to determine “why” the issue occurred. The guiding principles of 
“how” to perform the task or operation are often contained in procedures or data particular 
to the task. The information contained in procedures will enable a person to utilize other forms 
of knowledge. Prevailing safety culture within an organization will have an impact on learn-
ing from incidents. If a strong commercial/production culture exists, this may have an impact 
on, for example, the depth and breadth of learning from incidents within the company. Induc-
tion and initial training are important when accessing information for new staff. Accident data 
repositories contain well-documented human factor-related examples often relating to access 
to approved data and consequently resulting in potentially preventable incidents. Examining 
the limitations of each type of knowledge when continuation training programs are being de-
veloped was flagged as important by some participants. During the study, no discernible dif-
ferences were recorded in how the types of knowledge were differentiated in participant or-
ganizations. A review of the EU 1321/2014 [6] human factors syllabus requirements did not 
highlight a need to appreciate or account for these human centered limitations when design-
ing and delivering training lessons. Improved regulatory guidance on the design of effective 
human factor related material should therefore be developed. Information on how training 
should be structured in order to appreciate types of knowledge and capitalize on it as a mini-
mum are required to ensure the most efficacious outcome from incident-related training. 
4. Conclusions 
An ameliorating feature of learning from incidents is the potential to effect sustainable 
improvements in aviation safety. A review of safety from the perspective of maintenance and 
continuing airworthiness staff is key to understanding the relationship between safety and the 
concept of learning from incidents [31]. From the study’s qualitative data, we were able to 
identify how learning occurs in the airworthiness segment, and issues that support and con-
strain learning. Recurrent mandated training initiatives such as continuation training were 
found to be pivotal in enabling learning. Aspects such as prevailing culture and poor event 
causation were noted to have a negative impact on learning. Our proposed incident learning 
process (Figure 2) offers a panoramic of where potential learning opportunities and proce-
dural improvements can arise within the lifecycle of an incident. This perspective could be 
applied in support of developing regulatory working group specifications and validating con-
tinuation training initiatives. In addition, it could also be used to develop a holistic review 
approach to learning from incidents within other organizations both in the aviation industry 
and outside. Two notable limitations to our research arise. First, the scarcity of prior studies 
capable of supporting the basis for the research was pronounced. However, prior studies in 
parallel domains were successfully leveraged in support of the literature review. Second, the 
study’s population (n = 34) was relatively small. As the study participants were representative 
of all affected domain functions and a point of saturation was reached, it was deemed ade-
quate. 
This research is capable of supporting other papers on additional benefits associated with 
learning from incidents (LFI). Notably, with the imminent implementation of a safety man-
agement (SMS) requirement for continuing airworthiness organizations, potential improve-
ments to hazard identification arising from learning from incidents (LFI) could be highlighted. 
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Appendix A. Semi-Structured Interview Template 
Table 1. The Semi-Structured Interview Template used in this study 
Code 1 Code 2 Previous positions Years in previous positions 
Position Years in position Qualification Type of organization 
a. Reporting 
 Could you describe an occurrence/incident that happened recently? 
 How is a report made? 
 Who decides what events to report? 
 Where does the requirement to report come from? 
 How is the importance of reporting highlighted in the organization? 
 What do you think the aim of reporting is? 
 Have you received feedback from reports you have submitted? 
b. Just culture 
 Do you think there is a good safety culture in the organization? 
 Why is this? 
 Is it easy to communicate with management on safety issues? 
 Do you feel a just culture exists in the company? (Why is that?) 
 How does just culture impact on reporting? 
c. Learning 
 How are lessons that arise from occurrence/incident reporting delivered to staff in 
your area? 
 How is learning achieved? (What is the process?) 
 What obstacles to learning from incidents have you experienced in your position? 
 In your opinion, what conditions or developments could improve learning from in-
cidents/occurrences in your organization? 
d. Root Cause 
 What is your opinion on efforts to establish a single root cause when an incident/oc-
currence is investigated? 
 Is this approach always effective? 
 What situations have you experienced where incident causes can be numerous and 
complex? 
e. Occurrence/Incident Pre-cursors 
 How important is it to identify and report events not required by the mandatory oc-
currence reporting (MOR) schemes? (Why is this?) 
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 Is the organization’s occurrence/ incident reporting system capable of managing re-
ports other than MOR’s? 
 Is there a better way of gathering and using the potential information from non-man-
datory events? (What would you suggest?) 
Appendix B. Defining and Naming Themes 
Table 2. Taxonomy used in defining and naming the themes used in this study 
Phase 5—Categories Con-
ceptually Mapped and Col-
lapsed into 3 Major Themes 
with 8 Sub-Themes 








This relates to the three levels of 
learning suggested by Bateson 




This relates to when members of an 
organization reflect on previous 
learning and thereby setting about 
to improve its learning process. 
26 65 
Double-loop Learning 
This relates to learning that takes 
place and organizational norms and 
theory in use are changed. 
26 63 
Single-loop Learning 
This relates to when an organiza-
tions’ members detect and correct 
errors but still maintain the organi-
zations theory in use. 
26 63 
LEARNING PRODUCT 




This relates to measuring effective-
ness of learning 
31 155 
Types of knowledge 
This relates to conceptual, proce-





This relates to the inputs necessary 
to enable the assembly of a learning 




This relates to how learning infor-
mation is processed 
17 82 
Acquiring 
This relates to the sources of infor-
mation that support learning and 
how there are gathered 
16 55 
Storing 
This relates to how learning infor-
mation is stored 
12 27 
References 
1. Drupsteen, L.; Hasle, P. Why do organizations not learn from incidents? Bottlenecks, causes and conditions for a failure to 
effectively learn. Accid. Anal. Prev. 2014, 72, 351–358. 
2. Chang, Y.-H.; Wang, Y.-C. Significant human risk factors in aircraft maintenance technicians. Saf. Sci. 2010, 48, 54–62. 
Aerospace 2021, 8, 27 19 of 20 
 
 
3. Silva, S.A.; Carvalho, H.; Oliveira, M.J.; Fialho, T.; Soares, C.G.; Jacinto, C. Organizational practices for learning with work 
accidents throughout their information cycle. Saf. Sci. 2017, 99, 102–114. 
4. Akselsson, R.; Jacobsson, A.; Bötjesson, M.; Ek, Å.; Enander, A. Efficient and effective learning for safety from incidents. Work 
2012, 41, 3216–3222. 
5. Hobbs, A.N. Human Errors in Context: A Study of Unsafe Acts in Aircraft Maintenance. Ph.D. Thesis, University of New South 
Wales, Australia, 2003. 
6. European Commission (EU). Commission Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014 of 26 November 2014 on the Continuing Airworthiness of 
Aircraft and Aeronautical Products, Parts and Appliances, and on the Approval of Organisations and Personnel Involved in These Tasks; 
European Commission (EU): Brussels, Belgium, 2014. 
7. Harvey, C.; Stanton, N.A. Safety in system-of-systems: ten key challenges. Saf. Sci. 2014, 70, 358–366. 
8. European Commission (EU).Commission Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUN-
CIL of 3 April 2014 on the reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation, amending Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Directive 2003/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Com-
mission Regulations (EC) No 1321/2007 and (EC) No 1330/2007; European Commission (EU): Brussels, Belgium, 2014. 
9. Gerede, E. A study of challenges to the success of the safety management system in aircraft maintenance organizations in Tur-
key. Saf. Sci. 2015, 73, 106–116. 
10. Drupsteen, L.; Wybo, J.-L. Assessing propensity to learn from safety-related events. Saf. Sci. 2015, 71, 28–38. 
11. Argyris, C.; Schön, D.A. Organizational Learning II: Theory, Method, and Practice; Addison-Wesley Publishing Company: Boston, 
MA, USA, 1996. 
12. Drupsteen, L.; Guldenmund, F.W. What is learning? A review of the safety literature to define learning from incidents, accidents 
and disasters. J. Contingencies Crisis Manag. 2014, 22, 81–96. 
13. Fogarty, G.J.; Saunders, R.; Collyer, R. Developing a model to predict aircraft maintenance performance. In Proceedings of the 
10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA, 3–6 May 1999. 
14. Sms, I. Safety Management Manual (SMM). In Doc 9859; ICAO: Montréal, QC, Canada, 2012. 
15. Ward, M.; McDonald, N.; Morrison, R.; Gaynor, D.; Nugent, T. A performance improvement case study in aircraft maintenance 
and its implications for hazard identification. Ergonomics 2010, 53, 247–267. 
16. Jacobsson, A.; Ek, Å.; Akselsson, R. Learning from incidents–A method for assessing the effectiveness of the learning cycle. J. 
Loss Prev. Process Ind. 2012, 25, 561–570. 
17. Brunel, I. Sessional Papers Printed by Order of the House of Lords, or Presented by Royal Command; Government of Great Britain: 
London, UK, 1841. 
18. Furniss, D.; Curzon, P.; Blandford, A. Using FRAM beyond safety: A case study to explore how sociotechnical systems can 
flourish or stall. Theor. Issues Ergon. Sci. 2016, 17, 507–532. 
19. Hollnagel, E. Barriers and Accident Prevention; Ashgate Publishing: Farnham, UK, 2004. 
20. Okoli, C.; Schabram, K. A Guide to Conducting a Systematic Literature Review of Information Systems Research; Sprouts Farmers 
Market: Chandler, AZ, USA, 2010. 
21. Houghton, C.; Murphy, K.; Meehan, B.; Thomas, J.; Brooker, D.; Casey, D. From screening to synthesis: Using nvivo to enhance 
transparency in qualitative evidence synthesis. J. Clin. Nurs. 2017, 26, 873–881. 
22. Bandara, W.; Furtmueller, E.; Gorbacheva, E.; Miskon, S.; Beekhuyzen, J. Achieving rigor in literature reviews: Insights from 
qualitative data analysis and tool-support. Commun. Assoc. Inf. Syst. 2015, 37, 154–204. 
23. Gough, D.; Oliver, S.; Thomas, J. An Introduction to Systematic Reviews, 2nd ed.; Sage: London, UK, 2017; pp. 83–106. 
24. Meline, T. Selecting studies for systematic review: Inclusion and exclusion criteria. Contemp. Issues Commun. Sci. Disord. ASHA 
2006, 33, 21–27. 
25. Wienen, H.C.A.; Bukhsh, F.A.; Vriezekolk, E.; Wieringa, R.J. Accident Analysis Methods and Models—A Systematic Literature Review; 
University of Twente, Centre for Telematics and Information Technology (CTIT): Enschede, The Netherlands, 2017. 
26. Maykut, P.S.; Morehouse, R. Beginning Qualitative Research: A Philosophic and Practical Guide; Falmer Press: London, UK, 1994. 
27. Cooke, D.L.; Rohleder, T.R. Learning from incidents: From normal accidents to high reliability. Syst. Dyn. Rev. 2006, 22, 213–
239. 
28. Drupsteen, L.; Groeneweg, J.; Zwetsloot, G.I. Critical steps in learning from incidents: using learning potential in the process 
from reporting an incident to accident prevention. Int. J. Occup. Saf. Ergon. 2013, 19, 63–77. 
29. European Commission (EU). (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliment and the Council of 4 July 2018 on common rules in trhe field of 
civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and amending Regulations (EC) No 2111/2005, (EC) No 
1008/2008, (EU) No 996/2010, EU376/2014 and Directives 2014/30/EU of the European Parliment and the Council, and repealing Regu-
lation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliment and of the Council and Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91; European Commission 
(EU): Brussels, Belgium, 2018. 
30. Lindberg, A.-K.; Hansson, S.O.; Rollenhagen, C. Learning from accidents–What more do we need to know? Saf. Sci. 2010, 48, 
714–721. 
31. Lukic, D.; Littlejohn, A.; Margaryan, A. A framework for learning from incidents in the workplace. Saf. Sci. 2012, 50, 950–957. 
32. Steiner, L. Organizational dilemmas as barriers to learning. Learn. Organ. 1998, 5, 193–201. 
33. Taylor, F.W. The Principles of Scientific Management; Harper & brothers: New York, NY, USA, 1911. 
Aerospace 2021, 8, 27 20 of 20 
 
 
34. Weber, R. Editor’s Comments: The rhetoric of positivism versus interpretivism: A personal view. MIS Q. 2004, 28, 
doi:10.2307/25148621 
35. Guba, E.G.; Lincoln, Y.S. Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research; Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA, USA, 1994. 
36. Walsham, G. Interpretive case studies in IS research: nature and method. Eur. J. Inf. Syst. 1995, 4, 74. 
37. Oates, B.J. Researching Information Systems and Computing; Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA, USA, 2006. 
38. Hirschheim, R. Information systems epistemology: An historical perspective. Res. Methods Inf. Syst. 1985, 9, 13–35. 
39. Schwandt, T. Constructivist, interpretivist approaches to human inquiry. Handb. Qual. Res. 1994, 1, 118–137. 
40. Kitzinger, J. The methodology of focus groups: the importance of interaction between research participants. Sociol. Health Illn. 
1994, 16, 103–121. 
41. Bogardus, E.S. Social distance in the city. Proc. Publ. Am. Sociol. Soc. 1926, 20, 40–46. 
42. Frey, J.H.; Fontana, A. The group interview in social research. Soc. Sci. J. 1991, 28, 175–187. 
43. Powell, R.A.; Single, H.M. Focus groups. Int. J. Qual. Health Care 1996, 8, 499–504. 
44. Chatzi, A.V. The diagnosis of communication and trust in aviation maintenance (DiCTAM) model. Aerospace 2019, 6, 120. 
45. Chatzi, A.V.; Martin, W.; Bates, P.; Murray, P. The unexplored link between communication and trust in aviation maintenance 
practice. Aerospace 2019, 6, 66. 
46. Patton, M.Q. Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods, 2nd ed.; Patton, M.Q., Ed.; Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA, 
USA, 1990. 
47. Braun, V.; Clarke, V. Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qual. Res. Psychol. 2006, 3, 77–101. 
48.  QDA Training, 2013, Working with NVivo, Dublin, Ireland. 
49. Lincoln, Y.S.; Guba, E.G. Naturalistic Inquiry; Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA, USA,1985. 
50. Baskerville, R.; Pries, J.H. Short cycle time systems development. Inf. Syst. J. 2004, 14, 237–264. 
51.  Hammersley M, Atkinson P (2007) Ethnography: Principles in Practice. Third edition. Routledge, London. 
52. . Araujo, Luis. 1995. Designing and Refining Hierarchical Coding Frames. In Computer-Aided Qualitative Data Analysis: Theory, Meth-
ods and Practice. Udo Kelle, ed. pp. 96–104. London: Sage Publications.   
53. Birks, M.; Chapman, Y.; Francis, K. Memoing in qualitative research: Probing data and processes. J. Res. Nurs. 2008, 13, 68–75. 
54. Miles, M.B.; Huberman, A.M. Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook; Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA, USA 
1994. 
55. Bateson, G. The Logical Categories of Learning and Communication. In Steps to an Ecology of Mind; The University of Chicago 
Press: Chicago, IL, USA, 1972; pp. 279–308. 
56. Bedwell, W.L.; Salas, E. Computer-based training: Capitalizing on lessons learned. Int. J. Train. Dev. 2010, 14, 239–249. 
57. Thorndike, E.L. Fundamental theorems in judging men. J. Appl. Psychol. 1918, 2, 67. 
 
 
 
